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ABSTRACT
This paper examines diverse aspects of the
monetary integration of the ten new Member
States (NMS) which joined the EU on 1 May
2004 into the euro area. Most NMS have
undergone a rapid and deep transformation in
all areas with considerable progress in their
processes of reform and convergence, and more
is underway. While trade integration with the
other 15 EU Member States (EU15) has
progressed quickly, convergence in output
specialisation to EU standards has been slow,
especially if measured in real terms. This may
influence negatively the pace of real
convergence. Most NMS lag significantly
behind in building up and deepening their
financial systems. There is also evidence that
exchange rate flexibility may still be serving as
a useful shock absorber for some NMS, and so
far the evidence indicates that real exchange
rates have moved, broadly speaking, in line
with long term fundamental equilibria. On the
positive side, many NMS are quite advanced
relative to the euro area in the process of labour
market and institutional reform (their labour
market structures are more flexible than those
of the euro area countries). There is also some
evidence that a few NMS have a significant
degree of business-cycle synchronisation with
the euro area: hence, they may become less
likely to be affected by different economic
shocks. This, however, is not true for all NMS.
The monetary policy institutions of the NMS
have also converged to some degree: goals and
institutional settings of central banks are now
much more similar than before. A case-by-case
approach to adopting the euro, based on
country-specific conditions, seems natural due
to the differences between the countries.
JEL classification: E42, F13, F33 and F42
Keyword: Optimum Currency Area, Economic
and Monetary Integration and EMU5
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Third, there is also some evidence that a few
NMS have a higher degree of business-cycle
synchronisation with the euro area. Hence, they
may become less likely to be affected by
radically different economic shocks. This,
however, is not true for all NMS.
Fourth, we find that many NMS are quite
advanced relative to the euro area in the process
of labour market and institutional reform (their
labour market structures are more flexible than
those of the euro area countries), while they lag
significantly behind in building up their
financial systems. As regards financial
structures and financial deepening, much
remains to be done.
Fifth, there is evidence that exchange rate
flexibility may still be serving as a useful shock
absorber for some NMS, and so far the evidence
indicates that real exchange rates have moved,
broadly speaking, in line with long-term
fundamental equilibria.
Sixth, the monetary policy institutions of the
NMS have also converged to some degree. The
goals and institutional settings of central banks
are now much more similar than before.
Looking at central bank statutes, objectives,
strategies and instruments, we find that good
progress has recently been made in developing
sound central banking structures.
All in all there has been very significant
progress in the integration of the NMS but a lot
remains to be done. There are also still
considerable differences across them. Our view
is that the conditions for full monetary
integration have still not been reached for the
group as a whole. A case-by-case approach to
adopting the euro – based on country-specific
conditions – seems natural.
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This paper examines diverse viewpoints on the
monetary integration of the ten new EU
Member States (NMS) into the euro area.
Monetary integration means foregoing the use
of monetary and exchange rate policies for
national purposes alone. In signing the
Maastricht Treaty – that contains the
institutional arrangements for the conduct of
monetary policy in the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) – these countries
agreed to immediately start taking into account
the implications of such policies for other EU
members; in the longer run, monetary
integration means adopting the euro.
Most NMS have undergone a very rapid and
deep transformation in all economic and
institutional areas. We can in fact recognise
three broad phases: a rapid adjustment period
that spans from the early economic and
institutional liberalisation till 1996-97; a
period characterised by the emerging market
and Russian crises from 1997 to 1999, which
brought the NMS the pain of rapid financial
integration and capital volatility; and a period
of convergence with the EU, which brought
more sustained growth and stability.
We find evidence of NMS having made
significant progress in the processes of reform
and convergence, and more is under way.
However, a lot remains to be done.
First, all NMS have been able to achieve a high
pace of nominal convergence in recent years. As
far as real convergence is concerned, however,
the record is more mixed and differentiated.
Second, looking at more structural factors we
find that, while trade integration with the other
15 EU Member States (EU15) has progressed
quickly in recent years and is now quite
advanced, convergence in output specialisation
to EU standards has been slow, especially if
measured in real terms (excluding changes in
relative prices). This may influence negatively
the pace of real convergence.6
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Where do we stand? [Referring to the structural and institutional convergence of the New Member
States] “… the core message remains the same: a lot has been achieved, but many issues still remain
to be tackled. Assessing the current situation and establishing in which fields further action will be
required – be that with respect to further trade and financial integration, to intra-industrial
specialisation or to fiscal consolidation – is of paramount importance, especially to policy-
makers.”  Lucas Papademos at the Third ECB Central Banking Conference (21 October 2004).
States should relinquish their domestic
monetary and exchange rate autonomy given
the state (and likely progress) of their
economic structures. We examine the
economic integration of the NMS from a
number of different angles to determine what
this implies overall for the appropriate pace of
monetary integration. To this end, we review
evidence and arguments provided by other
authors and, when this is lacking, contribute
some of our own. The paper contains three
original contributions: first, we look at the
relationship between structural convergence of
output and income convergence; second, we
look at the effects of different exchange rate
regimes on the speed of real exchange rate
convergence; and third, we look at the actual
behaviour of some NMS’ central banks and find
that preferences and policy objectives are quite
similar.
We analyse all NMS together. This means
taking a broader view and conducting our
argument at a relatively high level of
generality. We are aware that important
differences exist across NMS. On the other
hand, there are also important similarities.
First, all the countries concerned are small
relative to the EU and the euro area. This means
that the consequences of their integration
strategies will fall mainly upon the NMS
themselves – the EU15 will be influenced only
to a limited extent. Second, all NMS have less
1 An economic frontier is any demarcation over which actual
and potential mobilities of goods, services and production
factors, as well as communication flows, are relatively low.
For a detailed definition and description of economic
integration see Pelkmans (2001).
2 The Maastricht Treaty contains the institutional
arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy in the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
1 INTRODUCTION
In May 2004 ten new countries joined the
European Union: by this act they expressed
their will to integrate their economies into an
enlarged EU. Economic integration is defined
as the elimination of economic frontiers
between two or more economies (Pelkmans
(2001)).1 In this paper we employ “economic
integration” to mean successful participation
in the single European market with free
exchange of goods and services, free movement
of capital and people, and common rules in
certain areas (competition, external trade,
money, and certain aspects of finance). The
word “integration” should not be interpreted as
uniformity: each new Member State (NMS)
will retain its comparative advantages and
economic specialisation – in fact it is precisely
from such differences that any gains from
membership originate. Monetary integration
means foregoing the use of monetary and
exchange rate policies for national purposes
alone. In signing the Maastricht Treaty, NMS
agreed to immediately start taking into account
the implications of such policies for other EU
Member States;2 in the longer run, monetary
integration means adopting the euro. The
historical legacy also implies that most of these
countries will face the additional challenge of
combining economic and monetary integration
in the EU with their domestic goals of
economic development and market-oriented
reform.
In this paper we review issues and evidence
relevant to monitoring the progress of the
integration process. Our focus is on monetary
integration and how this is linked with the rest
of the integration process. In particular, we are
interested in gauging how fast the new Member7
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developed economic and financial structures
relative to the other EU Member States (though
there are diversities among NMS in this
respect), suggesting that the direction of
changes is to some extent common. An
advantage of reviewing all NMS together is
that this allows us to single out differences that
may help them “chart their route” towards a
successful adoption of the euro.
In starting to think about these issues, it is
tempting to refer to the debate developed in the
mid-1990s, when the first “wave” of EMU was
in the making. At that time, most of the debate
focused on three questions (see Angeloni and
Dedola (1999)): (1) whether the prospective
members constituted an “optimum currency
area”, in the sense defined by Mundell, Kenen
and McKinnon in the 1960s;3 (2) if and how
their monetary policy transmission differed;
and (3) whether the diversity existing in the
prospective currency area would permit a
cohesive and efficient monetary policy
decision-making process. EMU supporters and
EMU sceptics cast their arguments mainly by
giving different answers to these questions.
Obviously, using the same framework today
requires caution, since conditions have
changed. The analysis now also considers
forward-looking elements. In fact, experience
has shown that many of the conditions
of a well-functioning currency area are
endogenous, i.e. possibly emerge as a result of
the monetary integration process itself.4 For
example, the degree of trade openness makes
successful participation in a currency area
more likely, but at the same time it may
also be influenced by such participation. A
similar argument applies to the transmission
mechanism, since the functioning of financial
markets is likely to undergo a structural
transformation in a currency area. As to the
monetary policy decision-making process, the
key difference between the 1990s and now is
that there is now a well-functioning European
Central Bank with its own monetary framework
and established track record. It may take the
NMS adopting the euro less time to adopt the
operational framework of the Eurosystem.
The paper is organised as follows. First we
review, in Section 2, the main recent
macroeconomic developments among NMS,
focusing particularly on nominal and cyclical
convergence. Next, in Sections 3 to 5, we
examine three factors concerning the real
sector of the NMS economies that are of central
importance when judging whether the optimum
currency area conditions are met: output
specialisation, asymmetric shocks and trade
integration. In Sections 6 and 7, we look at
labour markets and public finances, i.e. two
areas whose proper functioning can help to
smooth the effects of the loss of monetary
autonomy as long as the optimum currency area
conditions are not (fully) met. In Section 8, we
turn to financial structures and the monetary
policy transmission process. Finally, in
Section 9 we look at convergence of real
exchange rates and in section 10 at central
banking institutions and monetary policy-
making. Section 11 brings the main
conclusions together. To the extent possible we
have collected the longest available time series
in each area, but, regrettably, the starting point
and data coverage is uneven across the various
sections. Data and information here are
updated to the spring of 2005 (when possible).
3 Over the last 40 years there has been a rich debate on the
optimum currency area theory and its diverse properties (see
diverse references in Mongelli (2005)). Here we refer to the
theory in its broader interpretation and as an organising
device for the analysis.
4 There is now a rich debate on the endogenous effects
stemming from monetary integration. See Rose (2004) for a
meta-analysis of the effects of monetary integration around
the world, and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) for a
discussion of endogeneities among euro area countries.8
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b.Short term interest rates (3-month money market rate)
(% per annum)
c. Long term interest rates (harmonised)1)
(% per annum)
Source: Eurostat and ECB.
1) Yields refer to government bonds with maturities of close to ten years.
2) Interest rate indicator on new EEK-denominated loans to non-financial corporations and households with maturities over five
years (see Statistics Pocket Book 2005).
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2 MACROECONOMIC CONVERGENCE
OF THE NEW MEMBER STATES: SOME
RECENT DATA
The debate on European economic and
monetary integration in the late 1980s and
1990s devoted a lot of attention to the
convergence criteria which countries had to
meet if they wanted to join EMU.5 In this
section, we provide a bird’s eye view of
some selected indicators of nominal and
5 For details on the convergence criteria, see also the ECB
(2004) and European Commission (2004) convergence
reports.9
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Chart 2.2 Selected indicators of real convergence, 1995-2004
a.Real GDP growth per capita
(annual % changes; end of period)
b.Labor productivity (gross value added – total economy at constant prices per employes)
(annual % changes; end of period)
c. Comparative price levels)1)
(Euro Area = 100)



























































































































































































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
real convergence and external balances.
Specifically Chart 2.1 shows nominal
convergence (inflation and interest rates),
Chart 2.2 real convergence (growth,
productivity and price level convergence),
while Chart 2.3 shows exchange rates and
current account balances. We are able to
provide a fairly extensive coverage only from
1995 (or slightly earlier in some cases) and til
the spring of 2005 whenever possible.
From the standpoint of nominal convergence,
the earlier part of the sample period we are
considering is quite tumultuous: several NMS10
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Chart 2.3 Selected exchange rate indicators an current account balance, 1993/1995-2004


































































































































c. Current account balance (as percentage of GDP)
(end of period)
Source: ECB.
1) “Synthetic”EUR prior to 1999 (Q1 1999 = 100, increase means an appreciationof EUR).
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exhibited even double-digit inflation in the
run-up to the 1998 Russian crisis and
thereafter. All NMS have since been able to
bring down their inflation rates (see Chart
2.1a). Short-term and long-term interest rates
(Charts 2.1b and 2.1c) have also fallen
significantly toward euro area levels, albeit at
different paces. A group of countries, including
the Czech Republic, the Baltic countries, Malta
and Cyprus, exhibited earlier convergence than
others. Very importantly, such nominal
convergence also reveals the reform efforts
made by NMS and their clear policy
preferences that are discussed further below.
Chart 2.2 presents some indicators of real
convergence that reveal a more mixed picture.
All NMS have posted a higher per-capita real
GDP growth rate than the euro area average
(Chart 2.2a), but, with a few exceptions
(Hungary and Slovenia), they have also
exhibited very high volatility of real GDP
growth. Changes in labour productivity are
also higher than the euro area average but
generally exhibit high volatilities (Chart 2.2b).
Comparative price levels6 are still gradually
and slowly catching up with the euro area
level (Chart 2.2c). However, they are still
considerably lower in almost all NMS (with the
exception of Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia), and
it may require some time to close this gap.
A look at some selected exchange rate and
current account balance indicators is useful at
this stage to capture some of the different
developments experienced and policy
strategies pursued by the NMS (Charts 2.3a and
2.3b). A group of countries, i.e., Estonia,
Cyprus and Malta have maintained nominal
bilateral exchange rate pegs vis-à-vis the euro
over the whole period. The Czech Republic and
Slovakia have had flexible exchange rates
against the euro for several years. The Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia have
experienced some appreciation of the real
bilateral exchange rate on account of their
inflation rates being higher the euro area
average. Cyprus and Malta, on the other hand,
have recorded relatively stable real bilateral
exchange rates on account of their inflation
rates being relatively low vis-à-vis the euro
area average. Hungary, Poland and Slovenia
have seen a gradual depreciation of their
nominal bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the
euro over the period but have contained
appreciation in their real bilateral exchange
rates. Latvia and Lithuania are somewhere in
between, having experienced a significant real
appreciation, particularly in the early part of
the sample period. Last, the NMS have
experienced very different developments in
their current account balances, with some
countries exhibiting very high and volatile
deficits (such as Hungary, Estonia, Malta, and
Cyprus).
In summary, this brief overview of nominal and
real convergence indicators suggests that the
NMS have displayed a high level of
macroeconomic convergence with the euro area,
in particular on the nominal side. However, for
some countries this is still a very recent
achievement. The exchange rate indicators also
illustrate the different stages the countries have
reached in the process of convergence: some
NMS are still experiencing some nominal
depreciation or real appreciation (such as
Slovakia and to some extent Hungary).
Differences in the process of gradual
appreciation of NMS’ currencies are a
phenomenon that we discuss further in
Section 9. Their current exchange rate regimes
and plans for ERM II entry are summarised in
Table 9.1.
3 OUTPUT COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURAL
CONVERGENCE
We now turn to the composition of output,
which is important for assessing the degree of
structural convergence. There are several
reasons why this deeper level of real
convergence is relevant for this discussion. If
the output composition differs internationally,
6 In terms of final consumption by households including
indirect taxes as calculated by Eurostat.12
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sectoral disturbances tend to generate
asymmetric country disturbances.7 By a
similar reasoning, differences in the output
composition tend to generate asynchronous
national cycles, since sectors have different
cyclical properties and may even respond
differently to monetary policy (as recently
shown by Dedola and Lippi (2000)).
The composition of output and employment
tends to be closely related to the stage
of economic development. International
comparisons have shown that a higher level of
development tends to be associated with a
smaller share of agriculture in aggregate output
and a larger share of services, whereas the
share of industry typically has an inverted
U-shaped relationship to per capita output,
increasing first and declining later (Chenery
and Taylor, 1968). The output shares can then
be used to “benchmark” the degree of economic
development, as recently done for central
European countries by Raiser et al. (2003).
Against this background, we examine some
evidence regarding the composition of output
and employment in the NMS, using the euro
area and the United States as benchmarks for
comparison. We are mainly interested in
whether there are relevant differences in the
composition of output and in how the
differences have evolved over time.
Table 3.1 shows the shares of five activities
(agriculture, construction, manufacturing,
energy and services) in total value added for all
NMS, the euro area and the United States in the
period 1995-2003. Longer comparable data
series are unfortunately not available. Data for
all 25 EU Member States over this time span are
only available at this (low) level of
disaggregation.8 In order to condense a lot
of information, we also compute, following
Krugman (1993), an index of output
dissimilarity to assess the overall difference in
output composition between the NMS taken as
a region and the euro area. Our index is the sum
of the absolute differences in the shares of the
five activities, and is expressed as a percentage
of the maximum value this sum can assume (i.e.













where j denotes the activity. The construction
of the index is such that a value close to zero
indicates identical output composition, while
higher values up to 100 mean increasing
dissimilarity in output structure.
Table 3.1 (Panel a) that shows the shares of five
activities at current prices reveal a significant
difference in output composition between the
NMS and the euro area. Agriculture accounts
for a significantly larger share in the NMS, and
services represent a much smaller share.
Manufacturing and construction are marginally
larger in the NMS, as is the energy activity. At
the same time, while there are no dramatic
changes in the structure of output in such short
periods, as one would expect, there is
nonetheless a clear trend of convergence of the
NMS towards the euro area. The share of
agriculture declines while that of services
increases, and the distance indicator confirms
this overall impression. Interestingly, the
distance between the euro area and the United
States first declines and then rises in the nine-
year period considered. This is mainly due to a
marked increase in the share of services in the
United States from the beginning of the new
millennium, which was not matched by Europe.
Table 3.1 (Panel b) computes the same
measures on a real basis, i.e. using value added
data at constant (1995) prices rather than at
current prices, to examine whether the
movements noted in the previous panel are due
7 Kenen (1969) argues that a high diversification in production
and consumption within each country, i.e. in the “portfolio of
jobs”, and correspondingly in imports and exports, dilutes
the possible impact of shocks specific to any particular
sector. This reduces the need for changes in the terms of
trade via the nominal exchange rate.
8 Both Raiser et al. (2003) and Bems (2004) warn that the
distortion in the economic structure of formerly centrally
planned economies may bias the international comparisons
of output shares. The bias should be less relevant in our case
since our sample starts in 1995, when the transition process
was largely completed.13
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to real output redistribution, or changes in
relative prices, or both. In principle, one would
expect both price and quantity changes to
occur. Several forces are in motion.
Productivity growth in the traded sector should
raise the relative prices of services (to the
extent they are less traded) in NMS via the
Balassa-Samuelson mechanism. Changes in
consumption patterns linked to an increase in
living standards should also favour higher
demand for (and the prices of) services and
lower demand for agricultural products. At the
same time, one should see real resources flow
from the “stagnant” activities to the “growing”
activities, presumably services and to some
extent industry.9
Comparing the panels, the main message is that
on a real basis (Panel b), the changes in the
output composition are much less evident than
at current prices (Panel a). The declining trends
in agriculture and construction and the rising
trend in services are more muted; the share of
manufacturing rises rather than declines. The
overall distance between the NMS and the
euro area remains roughly constant. For
comparison, the gap between the euro area and
the United States again follows its U-shaped
9 Interestingly, while the pioneering research on the
redistribution of output (such as Baumol, 1967) concluded
that services would normally be a “stagnant” activity, where
productivity increase should be weaker than in the rest of the
economy, in the recent years this view has clearly changed.
Nordhaus (2002) shows that in the US the service activity
was the main contributor to the acceleration of productivity
in the second half of the 1990s.
Table 3.1a Output composition, 1995-2003 – Current prices
Source: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs).
1) Excluding Malta.
2) Excluding Ireland.
3) Smaller euro area countries: Greece and Portugal.
19995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
New Member States1)
agriculture 6.1 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.5 3.3
building and
construction 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.6 7.2 7.0 6.5 6.3 6.0
manufacturing 22.6 22.5 22.4 21.7 21.7 21.5 20.2 20.1 20.2
energy 6.4 6.1 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1
services 58.0 58.6 59.6 60.8 61.8 62.5 64.2 65.0 65.4
Euro area2)
agriculture 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2
building and
construction 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
manufacturing 20.6 20.1 20.2 20.2 19.8 19.8 19.5 19.1 18.7
energy 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
services 67.7 68.3 68.7 68.9 69.6 69.8 70.2 70.7 71.1
Distance between
NMS and euro area 9.6 9.7 9.1 8.2 7.8 7.3 6.0 5.5 6.0
Distance between
NMS and smaller
euro area countries3) 9.8 9.4 9.9 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.1 8.2 8.9
USA
agriculture 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0
building and
construction 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.4
manufacturing 16.3 15.8 15.8 15.4 14.8 14.5 13.3 12.9 12.7
energy 3.4 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.1
services 75.3 75.3 75.5 76.3 76.9 76.9 78.0 78.8 78.8
Distance between
USA and euro area 8.4 7.6 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.7 8.4 8.6 8.314
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curve, rising at the end of the sample due to a
sharp increase in the weight of services in the
United States.
Table 3.1 (Panel c) shows similar shares and
indices, but calculated on the basis of
employment rather than output. The difference
between the NMS and the euro area is much
greater, signalling that the stagnant activities
(agriculture particularly) are characterised by
lower labour productivity. The distance is also
great in the services activity, where it is rising.
The overall index shows some convergence,
but it is slow and starting from a high initial
level of convergence (i.e., there had already
been a lot of previous convergence).
As a check we also add a comparison with small
euro area countries, i.e. Greece and Portugal, as
data is missing for Ireland (see Table 3.1 Panels
a, b and c). The distance-indicator is even
higher, implying an even greater divergence
of the output composition of the NMS from that
of the small euro area countries (Greece and
Portugal only).
Table 3.2 documents the dispersion within the
two groups, the NMS and the euro area, proxied
by the standard deviation of the shares of
agriculture and services. The most evident
feature is that the dispersion is much higher in
the NMS, particularly in services. Unlike in the
euro area, there is no tendency for this
divergence to diminish over time.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
New Member States1)
agriculture 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.6 4.2
building and
construction 6.9 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.3 5.0
manufacturing 22.6 23.3 24.6 24.6 24.5 25.3 25.1 25.0 26.0
energy 6.4 6.7 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.2
services 58.0 57.4 57.0 57.7 58.2 57.9 58.7 59.6 59.6
Euro area2)
agriculture 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5
building and
construction 6.1 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1
manufacturing 20.6 20.1 20.4 20.5 20.1 20.2 20.0 19.8 19.7
energy 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8
services 67.7 68.1 68.3 68.4 68.8 68.9 69.4 69.7 69.9
Distance between
NMS and euro area 9.6 10.9 10.4 9.9 9.8 10.2 9.9 9.3 9.9
Distance between
NMS and smaller
euro area countries3) 9.8 10.1 10.8 9.9 10.4 11.0 10.5 10.8 11.0
USA
agriculture 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
building and
construction 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5
manufacturing 16.3 15.9 16.3 16.5 16.4 16.9 15.9 15.9 15.7
energy 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3
services 75.3 75.7 75.4 75.5 75.6 75.3 76.6 76.8 77.2
Distance between
USA and euro area 8.4 7.8 7.4 7.1 6.8 6.4 7.2 7.1 7.2
Source: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs).
1) Excluding Malta.
2) Excluding Ireland.
3) Smaller euro area countries: Greece and Portugal.
Table 3.1b Output composition, 1995-2003 – Constant prices
(% of total value added)15
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The evidence from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 raises
two questions. First, if indeed there are factors
impeding (or slowing down) structural changes
in the resource allocation in NMS, then what
are they and what policies are needed to remove
them? All in all, given the evidence presented
below, we doubt that the lack of labour market
flexibility is the reason. The root of the
problem could be in the financial markets. As
we will see below in Section 8, NMS are
generally characterised by undersized
domestic financial and banking sectors, a
deficiency only partly compensated by external
finance and by the presence of foreign
intermediaries. Finance is a critical input in the
process of economic restructuring, one that
requires the presence of several elements:
funding, project screening ability and a sound
attitude towards risk-taking, all of which in
turn require developed institutional and legal
structures. There are indications that some of
these elements may be missing in the case of
the NMS. Another impediment may be the slow
accumulation (or adaptation) of human capital.
In any case, we are not equipped to tackle this
type of question; neither is it central to this
paper.
The second question is qualitatively different:
what are the implications of the seemingly low
level of structural convergence for the process
of convergence of aggregate income and living
standards? In order to shed some light on
this issue, we insert our measures of  output
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
New Member States1)
agriculture 17.4 17.8 17.3 16.9 16.9 17.1 16.8 16.9 16.7
building and
construction 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.1 6.1
manufacturing 22.9 22.7 22.6 22.3 21.8 21.2 21.0 20.8 20.7
energy 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.8
services 50.3 50.4 50.8 51.5 51.9 52.2 52.9 53.5 53.7
Euro area2)
agriculture 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6
building and
construction 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1
manufacturing 20.2 19.9 19.7 19.5 19.2 18.9 18.7 18.3 18.1
energy 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.1
services 65.3 66.0 66.4 67.0 67.5 68.1 68.4 69.0 70.1
Distance between
NMS and euro area 17.7 18.2 17.9 17.4 17.1 16.8 16.6 16.8 16.1
Distance between
NMS and smaller
euro area countries3) 8.8 9.1 9.0 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.4 9.8 9.7
USA
agriculture 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
building and
construction 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.6
manufacturing 18.2 17.9 17.6 17.3 16.8 16.6 15.9 15.2 14.6
energy 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
services 74.3 74.5 74.7 75.0 75.4 75.6 76.2 77.0 77.5
Distance between
USA and euro area 11.8 11.3 10.9 10.7 10.4 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.7
Source: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs).
1) Excluding Malta.
2) Excluding Ireland.
3) Smaller euro area countries: Greece and Portugal.
Table 3.1c Output composition, 1995-2003 – Employment
(% of total value added)16
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composition into an empirical model of real
income convergence across countries, of the
type recently used by, for example, Sala-i-
Martin (1997). In the literature on this topic, it
is often mentioned that output composition
may be one of the determinants of real
convergence; our regressions explore this idea
in the context of NMS. Our specification has
the growth of per capita output on the left-hand
side and selected explanatory variables, among
those most commonly used in the literature,
on the right-hand side. We estimate this
specification in panel form for all NMS (except
Cyprus and Malta) over the period 1995-2003,
with annual data, as follows:
(1) ∆yt   =   β0   +  β1 · yt-1   +   β2 · Distancet
+   β3 · Distance servicest   +    β4 · Trade
opennesst +   β5 · Investmentt,
where yt stands for the log real per capita GDP;
Distancet and Distance servicest represents the
composition of output (constant prices)
relative to the euro area, considering all
activities and only the services activity
respectively;  Trade opennesst is the ratio of
each country’s exports plus imports to GDP;
Investmentt is the ratio of the country’s gross
capital formation to GDP; and ∆ is the first
difference operator.
In Table 3.3, column (1) shows the results for
the basic regression. NMS’ economic growth
rates are strongly affected by each period’s
starting level of per capita income (the β-
convergence discussed in the empirical growth
literature). Every percentage point increase in
per capita income reduces its growth rate by
around 1.7 percentage point. Next we extend
Source: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs).
1) Excluding Malta.
2) Excluding Ireland.
3) Weight: individual country shares in total activity’s output.
Table 3.2 Output composition – cross-country differences, 1995-2003
(% of total value added)
a. Current prices




agriculture 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.0




agriculture 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3
services 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.8 3
b. Constant (1995) prices




agriculture 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9




agriculture 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
services 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.517
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this specification. Column (2) shows that an
important factor is also the degree of trade
openness: NMS that are more open to trade
record higher economic growth (the coefficient
is not always significant though). Columns (3),
(4) and (5) explore the role of output
composition, using two indicators: the overall
Distance indicator and the simple difference in
the share of services. The significance of both
distance measures is obtained if both indicators
are included. Column (6), which excludes the
trade openness, shows that the distance
indicators retain explanatory power. Finally,
Columns (7) and (8) introduce the investment
rate, in line with what is suggested in the
empirical literature. This variable is indeed
significant, but it appears to be collinear with
the distance indicators (column (8) versus
column (5)) – as one would indeed expect, if
our hypothesis is true. All in all, Column (5),
with distance indicators and trade openness,
seems marginally better (in terms of statistical
performance) than Column (7), with trade
openness replaced by investment.
In summary, our evidence suggests that the
output composition of NMS is still
significantly different from that of the other
Member States. We do observe a certain
convergence in the relative weight of the main
components of output, but this seems largely
driven by changes in relative prices. The
differences in output composition enter
significantly in regressions explaining real per
capita growth in NMS. All in all, the evidence
shows that, although structural convergence is
ongoing, the process is far from complete and
needs to be better understood.
4 CYCLICAL PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE
OF SHOCKS
Most of the empirical literature on optimum
currency areas has focused on measuring cross-
country asymmetries in economic shocks and
in their propagation mechanisms. Intuitively,
the more similar aggregate supply and demand
shocks are, and the more similar the speed with
which the economy adjusts – taking into
Table 3.3 Output composition at constant prices – panel estimation: new Member States
(excluding Cyprus and Malta), 1995-2003
Dependent variable:  ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆yt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Independent  variables: Pooled OLS1)
Constant (b0) 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.0454) (0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0471) (0.0455) (0.0449) (0.0450) (0.0455)
yt-1 -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.16*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.017**
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Distancet -0.001 -0.009** -0.007** -0.006* -0.007*
(0.0012) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0041)
Distance servicest -0.0004 -0.007** -0.005* -0.004 -0.005
(0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0040)
Trade opennesst 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.028* 0.004
(0.0157) (0.0161) (0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0261)
Investmentt 0.12** 0.11
(0.0582) (0.0910)
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.17
Sources: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and Eurostat.
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%.
1) Based on “dynamic completeness of the conditional mean” (see data appendix).18
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consideration also the policy responses to
shocks – the less need there is for monetary
policy autonomy and the higher the net benefits
from adopting a common currency.10
Recently, several empirical analyses have
focused on the NMS. The results of this work
are fairly clear and have been summarized by
de Haan et al. (2004), so no additional analysis
is needed here. A meta-analysis of business
cycle correlation analyses has been conducted
by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2005), who survey
27 independent studies between 1998 and
2004. They find that results of the individual
studies differ quite significantly, depending on
the methodology, time span and data frequency
used. Hungary, Poland and Slovenia exhibit a
high correlation irrespective of the indicators
used – at a level comparable to that of some
“core” euro area member countries. Another
group of NMS (including the Czech Republic)
show a level of business cycle synchronisation
comparable to that of several euro area
countries.
Two papers raise some relevant additional
points. Frenkel and Nickel (2002) set up a
structural vector auto-regression model to
identify and compare demand and supply
shocks – as well as the speed with which
economies adjust to shocks – between euro area
countries and central and eastern European
countries (CEECs). They find that, over the
period 1993-2001, there are still differences in
the shocks and in the process of adjustment to
shocks when the euro area as a whole is
compared with the CEECs as a group. Some
caution is needed in interpreting the results
since a different picture emerges when
individual CEEC countries are compared with
individual countries of the euro area. There is
almost no difference between the more
advanced CEECs and the small euro area
countries as regards the correlation of their
shocks vis-à-vis the euro area. The authors see
reasons to believe that the similarity between
the CEECs and countries of the euro area will
increase over the next few years as their
economies become more integrated.
Darvas and Szapáry (2003) conduct an
extensive investigation of business cycle
synchronisation of most NMS (with the
exception of Cyprus and Malta) and euro area
countries. They use diverse macroeconomic
series, including GDP, industrial production,
private consumption, consumption of services,
and investment. Diverse measurement and
filtering techniques are applied for robustness.
They find evidence of high business cycle co-
movements for Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia exhibit a
lower degree of co-movement, while the
remaining Baltic countries show no co-
movement. There are diverse explanations and
caveats for such findings in the paper.11 At the
same time, the authors note that this may not be
worrisome, as business cycle synchronisation
has shown a high degree of “endogeneity” for
euro area countries: i.e. EU membership – and
in particular participation in the euro area — is
expected to foster co-movements through
diverse channels.
In summary, various studies in this field
suggest that most NMS are still significantly
diverse as to the size and nature of the
economic shocks to their business cycles.
While for some countries the cycles and the
underlying shocks seem to be strongly
correlated with the euro area, in many other
cases no stable co-movements can be detected.
In addition, with few exceptions, most NMS
exhibit a generally low speed of adjustment to
shocks. Overall, these results suggest that the
co-movements of economic cycles and of
structural disturbances between many NMS
and the euro area are more limited than the high
level of trade integration already achieved (see
10 Prominent studies in this literature are Blanchard and Quah
(1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996). Masson and
Taylor (1993) argued that analysing the nature of shocks is a
catch-all Optimum Currency Area property as it amounts to
jointly examining a number of different features relevant to
determining whether countries constitute an optimum
currency area.  Tavlas (1993) lists some caveats of this
literature.
11 One comment we may add is that the benchmark for
comparisons of synchronisation is not always clear because
of size differences: i.e. empirical tests compare countries
and/or regions of uneven sizes.19
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EU TRADE AREA next Section 5) could lead us to think. Only a
few NMS, such as Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia, have already achieved a good level of
economic correlation with the countries of the
euro area.
5 INTEGRATION IN THE EU TRADE AREA
Openness to international trade is a key
element in measuring the international
integration of any economy and in evaluating
options concerning exchange rate regimes and
entry into a currency union. The higher the
degree of openness, the more changes in
international prices of tradables are transmitted
to domestic prices and the cost of living, and
the less useful is the nominal exchange rate as
an adjustment instrument. Moreover, a high
trade openness is likely to lead to more
synchronous economic cycles and reduce the
need for domestic stabilisation policies, an
argument made for example by Frankel and
Rose (1998 and 2000) and Rose (2000).
In Table 5.1 we provide data on trade openness,
defined as the average ratio of exports and
imports to GDP, in the period 1995-2004.
These data clearly signal a high and rising
degree of openness for NMS. In the period, the
average openness of the NMS rises from 32% to
48%, whereas that of euro area members
(including intra-area trade) rises from 27% to
35%. It is also noteworthy that the degree of
openness is more uniform within the group of
NMS (standard deviation of about 15%) than it
is for the euro area members (standard
deviation of around 20% at the end of the
sample). The smaller NMS tend to be more
open, as is the case in the euro area.
For a more direct measure of reciprocal trade
integration it is necessary to look at bilateral
flows. Table 5.2 shows that for selected pairs of
Table 5.1 Trade openness, 1995-2004
(exports plus imports in percentage of GDP)
Sources: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and DTS (International
Monetary Fund).
1) Large NMS: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
New Member States
Czech Republic 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.56
Estonia 0.58 0.57 0.75 0.72 0.64 0.84 0.77 0.72 0.75 0.74
Cyprus 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.27
Latvia 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.36 0.41 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.45
Lithuania 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.52 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.55 0.54 0.57
Hungary 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.42
Malta 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.74 0.62 0.77 0.93 0.63 0.61 0.75
Poland 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.30
Slovenia 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.50
Slovakia 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.62
mean 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.48
standard deviation 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.15
NMSL1) 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.42
Euro area
Total trade
mean 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35
standard deviation 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.21
Extra-euro area trade
mean 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18
standard deviation 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08
USA 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.0920
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country groups, the ratio of bilateral exports to
total exports (average of the group and standard
deviation). For example, the first line in the
table reveals that in 1995 on average 14% of
NMS’ exports were directed to other NMS,
with a standard deviation across countries of
14%. In the next lines we see that the share of
NMS’ exports going to the euro area rose from
40% to 55% in the period, a number that is
higher than that for the euro area countries
themselves (50%). The standard deviation of
exports to the euro area among NMS
interestingly declines, reaching 10% in 2004.
Another interesting measure is that obtained
by combining NMS and euro area countries,
as in a hypothetical extended euro area, to
see the share of NMS exports that would
be directed to recipients within this enlarged
area. Again we see a very high and rising
integration (from 54% to 70%). A more
detailed overview of NMS’ and the euro
area’s total exports/imports (in percentage
shares) to/from various regions, confirming
the basic message just described, is provided in
the appendix (Table A.1).
In summary, our evidence on trade openness
and the direction of exports indicates that the
NMS have recently considerably increased
their trade integration with the euro area. Their
share of trade with the euro area is, on average,
even greater than that of within the euro area.
Trade integration may have implications for
exchange rate volatility and for the choice of
the exchange rate regime, aspects to which we
will turn in Section 9.
6 LABOUR MARKETS
From the viewpoint of optimal currency
areas, the way labour markets function is
important in two respects. First, flexible
labour markets (i.e. with features including
a competitive wage setting mechanism;
geographical and intersectoral labour mobility;
efficient information; a light and transparent
regulatory framework) reduce the costs of
adverse demand and supply disturbances in
terms of output and employment. A flexible
labour market reduces the need to resort to
active monetary and exchange rate policies
to smooth the impact of these shocks at
the national level, facilitating a country’s
participation in a currency area.12 Second,
the labour market is at the same time a
relevant channel of transmission of economic
12 For a thorough definition and description of labour market
flexibility see Beatson (1995).
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
NMS towards NMS
mean 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
standard deviation 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
NMS towards euro area
mean 0.40 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.55
standard deviation 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
Total
(NMS towards NMS and euro area)
mean 0.54 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.70
Euro area towards euro area
mean 0.52 0.51 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.50
NMS towards USA
mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Euro area towards USA
mean 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Table 5.2 Export diversification, 1995-2004
(percentage ratio of bilateral exports to total exports)
Source: DOT (International Monetary Fund).21
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disturbances (monetary and other) to prices and
to the real sector; as such, it affects the cyclical
properties of the economy as well as the
“sacrifice ratio”, i.e. the price/output tradeoffs
faced by monetary policy-makers. Hence, a
currency area can operate more smoothly when
the labour market structures of its member
countries are relatively similar and adaptable.
This reduces the risks of internal tensions when
the area is hit by common (e.g. monetary
policy) shocks.
Over the last 10-15 years, the labour markets of
the NMS have witnessed an enormous
turnaround. They have evolved from a
centralised system to a more liberalised
regime. Given this evolution, which is still
under way, we are only able to tentatively
compare labour market characteristics and
institutions and assess the degree of labour
market flexibility in comparison with that of
the euro area.
We first assess some indirect evidence on the
degree of competitiveness of labour markets.
Chart 6.1 shows the degree of labour force
participation (the labour force as a percentage
of the population aged 15-64) in the NMS and
euro area countries, and compares it with that
in the United Kingdom, the United States and
Japan. All other things equal, the higher the
participation in the labour force, the more
competitive the market is likely to be. Our
comparison shows that the Netherlands is at the
top of the ranking, followed by the United
Kingdom and the United States. The NMS are
on average behind the euro area, and both are
significantly behind the United States, the
United Kingdom and Japan. There are
considerable differences within the two groups
– Cyprus and the Netherlands are at the top of
the respective rankings of the NMS and the
euro area countries.
Table 6.1, Column 2 compares the degrees of
trade union membership (expressed as a
percentage of total dependent workers).
Rankings here are almost the mirror image of
those in the previous chart: unionisation is
higher in the NMS and the euro area relative to
the United States and the United Kingdom.
Again there is a lot of dispersion across the
NMS, but no less in the euro area. In the euro
area, unionisation is slightly higher than in the
NMS on average. The last three columns of
Table 6.1 show the prevailing wage setting
Chart 6.1 Labour force participation
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practices. Collective bargaining coverage is
considerably lower in the NMS, and most of the
bargaining takes place at the company level,
while in the euro area bargaining takes mainly
place at the sectoral or national level. The
picture emerging from this table is that, in
general, these practices tend to be more
competitive in the NMS than in the euro area.
However, both groups of countries are on
average less competitive than the United
Kingdom.
Table 6.2 provides some information on the
stringency of employment protection
legislation and the generosity and duration of
unemployment benefits. This is also an area in
which transformation is rapid and information
is unfortunately patchy. Table 6.2 illustrates
that, on average, the NMS are somewhat more
flexible than the EU15 countries.
Chart 6.2 gives some indication of how labour
mobility in the largest NMS compares with that
in the EU15. Unfortunately these data only
allow us to measure the percentage of the
population changing residence domestically,
and not from one country to another (i.e., the
data doesn’t show someone moving from
Poland to the Czech Republic). Mobility in the
EU15 is only slightly higher than in the largest
NMS, whereas they are both sharply below that
in the United States. In the United States about
Union density Collective bargaining Dominant bargaining Low pay regulation
(%)1) coverage (%) level mechanism
Czech Republic 30 25-30 Company National minimum wage
Estonia 14.8 29 Company National minimum wage
Cyprus 70 65-70 Sectoral Collective agreements
Latvia 30 <20 Company National minimum wage
Lithuania 15 10-15 Company National minimum wage
Hungary 20 34 Company National minimum wage
Malta n.a. n.a. Company National minimum wage
Poland 15 40 Company National minimum wage
Slovenia 41.3 100 Intersectoral National minimum wage
Slovakia 40 48 Sectoral National minimum wage
NMS2) 34.13) 403) n.a. n.a.
Belgium 69.2 100 Intersectoral National minimum wage
Germany 29.7 67 Sectoral Collective agreements
Greece 32.5 n.a. Sectoral National minimum wage
Spain 15 81 Sectoral National minimum wage
France 9.1 90 Company National minimum wage
Ireland 44.5 n.a. Intersectoral National minimum wage
Italy 35.4 90 Sectoral Collective agreements
Luxembourg 50 60 Company/sectoral National minimum wage
Netherlands 27 78 Sectoral National minimum wage
Austria 39.8 98 Sectoral Collective agreements
Portugal 30 62 Sectoral National minimum wage
Finland 79 90 Intersectoral Collective agreements
Euro area2) 38.4 814) n.a. n.a.
Denmark 87.5 85 Sectoral/intersectoral n.a.
Sweden 79 94 Sectoral n.a.
UK 29 36 Company n.a.
EU15 30.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 6.1 Labour market institutions
Sources: European Commission and European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) “Industrial relations in the EU Member
States and candidate countries” (2002).
Note: Data refers to various years in the period 1999-2001.
1) Union membership as a percentage of total employment.
2) GDP-weighted.
3) Excluding Malta.
4) Excluding Greece and Ireland.23
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Employment1) Collective Overall Replacement ratio, % Duration of
dismissals1)  index1) 2) (in raltion to previously unempolyment
gross earnings)3) benefits (month)
Regular Temporary
Czech Republic 2.8 0.5 4.3 2.1 50, 40 after 9 months3) 6
Estonia 3.1 1.4 4.1 2.6 Flat rate of 8% of the
gross average wage4) 64)
Cyprus 60 156 working days
Latvia 50 9
Lithuania 9–343) 6
Hungary 2.1 0.6 3.4 1.7 65 12
Malta n.a. n.a.
Poland 2.2 1 3.9 2 Flat rate of EUR 115 12 (longer in areas
(22% of the with high unempl.)5)
average wage)5)
Slovenia 3.4 2.4 4.8 3.5 70, 60 after 3 months 3-24 depending on
length of employment
Slovakia 2.6 1.4 4.4 2.4 60, 50 after 3 months 9
NMS6) 2.7 1.2 4.1 2.4
EU15 2.4 2.1 3.2 2.4 median 70 (range 40-90) median 12 (range 6-60)
Table 6.2 Employment protection and unemployment benefits
Sources:  OECD, Riboud et al. (2002), European Commission and Polish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour website for data
on Poland.
1) Indicators translate into values ranging from 0 (no employment protection) to 5 (strict employment protection).
2) Overall index: average of the indicators for regular/temporary employment and collective costs of dismissal.
3) For the Czech Republic and Lithuania, previous net earnings.
4) Reshaping of benefit programme in 2001 with the new benefits paid in 2003. Under the new programme, the benefits are earnings-
related. Data presented in the table refer to the previous programme.
5) Flat rate adjusted for CPI, set at PLN 498.20 for the second half of 2003.
6) Excluding Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.
2.8% of the population changes residence in
any given year, nearly twice as much as in the
EU.
In summary, labour markets of the NMS have
undergone considerable transformations.
Given the sketchiness of the data, we are only
able to compare some specific dimensions. In
some areas NMS labour practices seem
significantly more flexible, for example
unionisation and the incidence of collective
bargaining. There is significant heterogeneity
in labour market institutions across the NMS as
well as the EU15 countries. Furthermore, there
is still a significant gap between the continental
European countries (including the NMS) and
the United States, and to a lesser extent the
United Kingdom, which both have very
flexible labour markets.
Chart 6.2 Labour mobility
Sources: European Commission, OECD and Center for Social
and Economic Research.
1) Data for the USA unavailable beyond 1987.
y-axis: Country (year)
x-axis: % of population changing residence
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7 PUBLIC FINANCES
With the EU accession, NMS have become
subject to the EU fiscal framework, including
also the fiscal requirements for the eventual
adoption of the euro. The interest in the stance
of public finances in NMS has increased
recently; research in this area includes Orban
and Szapáry (2004), who focus on the NMS’
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact
for euro area countries and Rzonca et al.
(2005), who examine the effects of fiscal
adjustment strategies on the NMS’ economies.
Recently, von Hagen and Traistaru (2004) have
provided an overview of literature relating to
four key aspects of public finances in the NMS:
a) the size of the public sector; b) the
sustainability of public debt; c) the quality of
the budget; and d) the role played by the
budgeting institutions. In this section we limit
ourselves to presenting a few basic data on the
situation of the NMS on average; we refer to the
literature for further detail.
The state of a country’s public finances is
relevant to its participation in a currency area
because they affect the conditions of
participation for the country itself, or for
others. On the one hand, the theory of optimum
currency areas suggests that countries
relinquishing monetary policy independence
need to rely more on other policy instruments
to conduct counter-cyclical actions, including,
first and foremost, fiscal policy. A flexible and
adjustable (and by implication, sustainable)
budget is therefore necessary for a country
considering adopting a common currency.
Alternatively, a union budget with a system
of supranational fiscal transfers would be
necessary to guarantee full adjustment to
asymmetric shocks (Kenen, 1969), a
requirement clearly not fulfilled by the EU
at present. On the other hand, in a monetary
area, each country’s public finances can
more easily affect the conditions for other
countries, and a stronger bias towards higher
deficits and debts can arise, as stressed by
the political economy literature (Schuknecht,
2004).
Table 7.1 Public debt and deficits, 1998-2004
(% of GDP)
a. Gross debt




mean 27.9 34.7 34.6 36.0 37.0 39.5 39.8 1.7
standard deviation 22.0 20.8 20.0 19.8 20.3 22.5 23.6 .
Euro area
mean 69.1 67.7 64.7 64.2 63.4 63.3 63.1 -0.8
standard deviation 32.6 32.3 32.3 32.2 31.5 30.2 30.0 .
b. Net deficit/surplus
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 average
New Member States
mean -2.1 -3.3 -3.9 -3.5 -4.1 -4.5 -2.9 -3.5
  standard deviation 1.8 1.4 3.3 2.1 2.9 4.4 2.1 .
Euro area
mean -1.3 -0.5 0.8 -0.2 -1.1 -1.7 -1.8 -1.0
standard deviation 1.9 1.5 3.4 2.2 3.0 4.6 2.2
Sources: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and Eurostat.25
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Table 7.1 shows the public sector deficit and
debt, for the group of NMS taken as an
aggregate and for the euro area, over the period
1998 to 2004. The debt/GDP ratio is much
lower in the NMS than in the euro area (Panel a)
but rises – in the euro area it slowly declines.
The different trend is the result of significant
deficits in the NMS of around 4% of GDP or
more, against much smaller deficits in the euro
area. In both areas there are significant
differences across countries. More information
on the structure of the budgets (revenues and
expenditures) is reported in Table 7.2. Some
significant differences exist between the two
groups. First, the weight of indirect taxes
relative to direct taxes is higher in the NMS
than the euro area. Indirect taxes may be
more flexibly manageable, and easier to
administer (for example, as regards preventing
tax evasion); they may also represent less
of a disincentive to labour and capital
accumulation. On the revenue side, public
consumption (which includes public sector
wages), once a relatively small share, has
climbed and now constitutes over 50% of
GDP (42% in the euro area). Interest payments
are broadly comparable between the two
groups, but the composition is clearly
different; in the NMS they are made up by
a higher interest rate accruing on a lower level
of debt. This may give some room for fiscal
manoeuvre forwarding future, when interest
rates in the NMS converge to the lower level
of the euro area.
In summary, the public finance situation of the
NMS, taken as a whole, appears relatively
comfortable at present if one looks at the low
level of debt. However, the existence of a very
high deficit on average, and the high and rising
Table 7.2 Structure of public finance, 1995–2004
a. New Member States1)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total revenues (% of GDP) 38.2 38.0 38.0 37.4 36.8 42.0 42.5 42.5 42.3 42.8
of which (% of total revenues)
Direct taxes and social contributions 52.8  51.0   51.1  51.8 52.0  51.9 52.5 52.2  51.8 49.3
Indirect taxes 32.7  33.1 32.0 32.6 33.0 33.7 32.7 32.8 33.0 33.0
Other revenues  14.5  15.9  16.9  15.6  15.0  14.4  14.8  15.0  15.2  17.6
Total Expenditure (% of GDP) 43.0  41.7  41.2 39.8 39.4 38.3 39.4 38.6 38.9  37.1
of which (% of total expenditures)
Transfers to households 28.3 29.8 30.0 30.9 32.9 38.0 37.5 38.2 37.9  39.1
Interest payments   7.8   6.7   5.6   3.7   3.8   7.8   7.4   7.0   6.6   6.6
Consumption  expenditures  39.1 40.5 40.5  41.5  41.8   51.1 49.7 52.3 52.4  53.1
Other expenditures 24.8 23.0 23.9 23.9  21.4    3.1   5.3   2.5   3.0 1.1
1) Excluding Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia (for the entire period) and Hungary (for the period 1995-1999).
b. Euro area
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total revenues (% of GDP) 46.4 47.2 47.6 47.0 47.5 47.2 46.5  46.1 46.2 45.7
of which (% of total revenues)
Direct taxes and social contributions 62.0 62.4 62.3  61.3  61.3  61.7  61.6   61.1 60.4 60.4
Indirect taxes 26.9 26.8 27.0 28.7 28.9 28.7 28.5 29.0  29.1 29.7
Other revenues    11.1  10.8  10.7  10.0   9.9   9.6   9.9   9.9  10.5   9.9
Total Expenditure (% of GDP)  51.5  51.5 50.2 49.3 48.8  47.1 48.2 48.5  49.1 48.4
of which (% of total expenditures)
Transfers to households 33.6 34.3 35.0 34.8 34.8 35.3 34.4 34.9  35.1 35.3
Interest payments  10.9   11.0  10.3   9.6   8.7   8.6   8.2   7.5    7.1   6.8
Consumption expenditures 39.8 39.8 40.3 40.4 40.7 42.2  41.6  42.1  42.1 42.3
Other expenditures  15.7  14.8  14.4  15.3  15.8  13.8  15.8  15.5  15.8  15.6
Source: AMECO (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs).26
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share of public consumption, which may be
difficult to compress in the future13, do not
leave room for complacency. Another aspect
deserves consideration: i.e. the macroeconomic
context in the NMS. They have higher output
growth than the average euro area country. This
makes the fiscal situation in many NMS even
more critical.
8 FINANCIAL MARKETS AND MONETARY
TRANSMISSION
There are still some differences in the monetary
transmission mechanism between the NMS and
euro area countries: we first review some
recent studies and then look at some
differences in the respective financial sectors.
The link between financial structures and the
monetary policy transmission mechanism is
one of the most widely explored areas of recent
empirical research. The debate in this area
received new impetus in the late 1990s, in
connection with the preparation of EMU. Most
of the attention was concentrated, at that time,
on the possibility that the differences in the
financial and banking markets across EMU
candidates could result in asymmetries in the
effect of the single monetary policy once the
euro was introduced. Moreover, Cecchetti
(2001)14 drew attention to the fact that
differences in financial structures are related to
the nature of the national legal system, and
therefore are difficult to reduce in a short
period of time. 15
Recently, a number of studies have appeared on
the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy in the NMS. Often these studies take the
results of the Eurosystem project as
benchmark. Jarociñsk (2004) compares
responses to monetary shocks for several euro
area countries with those in the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia using a Bayesian estimation
technique. Interestingly, he finds that the
short-run output and price responses are
stronger in the euro area than in the NMS, while
in the medium run the response is of
comparable size. He also finds that interest rate
shocks are stronger and more persistent in
NMS, while the accompanying exchange rate
effects are similar in size but also more
persistent. Stronger and/or more protracted
interest rate and exchange rate movements
in the NMS have an ultimate effect, but
short-term responses are muted. The author
conjectures that the short-term sluggishness
may depend on the functioning of the financial
markets, whose lack of depth prevents, at first,
an efficient transmission of the change of
monetary policy to the financial conditions
faced by household and firms.
Schmitz (2004) directly investigates the role of
banks in monetary policy transmission in the
NMS. She shows that banks contract their
lending in response to an increase in the short-
term interest rate of the euro area but exhibit
only a weak reaction after changes in the
domestic monetary indicator. This is attributed
to the dominant role played by foreign-owned
banks, which adjust their lending to a greater
extent after an increase in euro area interest
rates than their domestic-owned competitors
do with respect to domestic rates. Since the
presence of foreign-owned banks has been
rising in NMS, one should expect euro area
monetary policy to have an increasing effect on
monetary and financial conditions in the NMS.
She also finds that larger banks show a weaker
response to monetary policy, in line with
earlier findings in the literature on the credit
channel.
Anzuini and Levy (2004) review the financial
structure of the three largest NMS, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland, with emphasis
on the corporate and household sectors, against
the benchmark of the EU15 average. Three
13 Especially if, as seems likely, part of the increase depends on
wage increases attributable to Balassa-Samuelson effects.
We thank György Szapáry for pointing out this possibility to
us.
14 For other related essays and for references to the relevant
literature, see also Bundesbank (2001).
15 Angeloni et al. (2003) describe the results of an empirical
project conducted by the ECB and by the euro area national
central banks.27
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aspects stand out. First, the large NMS have a
lower financial depth: total financial assets are
in a range of 2.5 to 4.5 times GDP, which is
far behind the EU average of 8 times GDP.
Financial depth is greatest in the Czech
Republic, at 4.5 times GDP. Households hold
few financial assets: between 55% and 83% of
GDP in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic,
compared with 232% in the EU. As a result, the
wealth effects of equity prices and the impact
of interest rates on their balance sheets are
weak. The second feature is that these countries
exhibit a low level of financial intermediation,
measured as the ratio of financial assets held
by banks to financial assets held by other
sectors. The low level of bank credit (often
substituted by trade credit) reduces the
relevance of credit channel effects and may
explain why interest rate changes have less
impact on the respective economy, especially
in the short term. The balance-sheet channel
is also relatively weak due to the modest size
of marketable debt and a low impact of
interest rates on firms’ balance sheets. The
third feature is that foreign financial
intermediaries play an important role in these
financial systems.
Outside the financial system, there are other
characteristics that may make the NMS’
economies more sensitive to monetary policy.
Since the size of capital stock in these
economies is adjusting upward, they tend to
exhibit a higher share of investment in GDP,
see Süppel (2003). As consumer credit to
households is expanding, credit could be more
important on the margin than on average.
Moreover, as we have seen, NMS are very open
to international trade but they specialize in
production characterized by relatively high
price elasticity, something that could make the
exchange rate channel stronger.
All in all, it seems reasonable to focus on
financial markets when trying to explain the
relatively weak short-term monetary
transmission mechanism suggested by the
econometric literature. In the rest of this
section we review some data concerning
specific features of the financial systems,
among those more likely to affect the
transmission, as usual with the euro area as
benchmark for comparison.
We have already mentioned the relative lack
of financial depth in the NMS. Chart 8.1
documents this and provides a further
breakdown by country. The ratio of financial
assets to GDP is more than double in the euro
area, as we have noted. Among the NMS, the
three largest countries are close to the group
average, with the Czech Republic slightly
more financially developed than Hungary and
Poland. Domestic bank credit as a percentage
of GDP (Chart 8.2) is also double in the euro
area, and the gap seems to have been on the
rise between 1995 and 2004. Cyprus and Malta
are more credit-intensive than the CEECs,
reflecting the structural weaknesses that the
transition process has entailed for the banking
sectors in these countries. Among the largest
countries, the Czech Republic and Hungary
seem more credit-intensive than the average for
the NMS, but the distance here is shrinking.
Chart 8.3 plots outstanding bank loans and
stock market capitalisation as percentages
of GDP. Interestingly, while scatter points
below the 45-degree line reveal that the NMS
are generally using more bank credit than
market-based finance, this propensity is not
stronger (in fact it is slightly weaker) than in
the euro area. Finally, Table 8.1 collects a
number of indicators describing the structure
of the banking sector and the financial structure
of the corporate sector. The choice of
indicators is inspired by Cecchetti (2001), but
is subject to certain availability constraints.
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the low
credit-intensity, the number of credit
institutions per capita is not lower in the
NMS. The banking sectors of the NMS are
more concentrated, and are characterised by
higher interest margins and the incidence of
costs. These indicators would speak for a low
level of competition and efficiency in the
provision of banking services. However,
the ECB (2005) suggests that there is a high
degree of competition at least in some NMS,28
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attributable to the aggressive lending
behaviour of (mostly foreign-owned) banks.
The corporate sector indicators all document
the low incidence of market-based debt in the
NMS, relative to population and GDP.
Whereas, as we noted just above, the incidence
of market financing is not low in relation to
Chart 8.2 Domestic bank credit as a
percentage of GDP
Sources: AMECO (European Commission Directorate
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Chart 8.1 Ratio of financial assets to GDP,
2002
Source: ECB.
1) Excluding Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg.
2) Excluding Cyprus, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia.
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Table 8.1 Structure of banking sector and corporate finance, 2004
Banks Corporate finance
Credit Concentration Net Cost to Publicly Stock market Corporate
institutions ratio: top interest income traded capitalization debt by
per million five banks margin ratio domestic as % of  GDP residence
people1) (as % of total companies of issuer
bank assets) per million as %
people of GDP
Euro area 20.7 55.9 0.4 62.7 18.4 58.8 154.3
NMS 20.5 65.7 1.4 60.9 13.7 25.5 38.82)
Czech Republic 6.9 68.1 2.3 125.2 5.2 25.2 53.5
Estonia 5.2 47.4 2.2 47.4 10.4 51.8 -
Cyprus 547.1 73.7 2.2 63.2 199.8 28.9 45.4
Latvia 9.9 77.7 0.4 77.7 24.2 9.7 -
Lithuania 20.9 62.8 1.7 62.8 12.5 26.5 -
Hungary 21.9 68.6 0.5 68.6 4.5 26.2 61.5
Malta 30.0 50.4 1.4 50.4 32.5 48.2 -
Poland 17.2 61.0 2.8 61.0 5.5 26.6 39.9
Slovenia 13.0 68.9 2.7 68.9 70.1 27.5 8.4
Slovakia 4.1 78.4 0.2 78.4 54.7 9.8 9.5
Source: AMECO (EC/ECFIN), BankScope, BIS, ECB, Federation of European Securities Exchanges, and World Federation of Stock
Exchanges.
1) “Credit institutions per million people” refers to the definition used in the directive “2000/12/EC”, i.e. the term “bank” is not
defined by the ECB.
2) For corporate debt w/o Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.
bank financing, it is low in relation to the size
of the economies, another indication of the low
financial depth of these countries.
In summary, the lesser degree of development
of the financial sectors in the NMS relative to
the euro area is quite significant and emerges
from several indicators that we have examined.29
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It is reasonable to assume that this feature
could be behind some of the differences that
have been detected in the transmission
mechanisms between the NMS and euro area
countries: e.g. particularly the longer lags of
monetary transmission.
9 EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES AND
CONVERGENCE
This section looks at the record of exchange
rate movements of the NMS, the process of
convergence of relative prices, and the merits
of exchange rate flexibility. The management
of exchange rates in the NMS during the
process of economic reform and in preparation
for EU membership has been extensively
discussed. As shown in Section 2, the strategies
adopted by individual countries have differed
significantly, and some have made exchange
rate policy a central aspect of their overall
integration strategy. On the one hand, a high
degree of exchange rate flexibility may reduce
the burden on policy-makers, freeing up room
for manoeuvre that can be used to attain
domestic policy targets. On the other hand,
excessive exchange rate volatility may be a
hindrance to the convergence process itself, by
undermining the effort to stabilise market
expectations. Striking the correct balance can
be particularly complex.
With accession, the NMS have adhered to a set
of rules which commit them to cooperation and
consultation on exchange rate matters through
participation in ERM II when conditions are
ripe.16 Recently, Buiter and Grafe (2002) and
von Hagen and Traistaru (2004) have compared
these rules to a “purgatory”, a punishment that
Exchange rate regime   Entry into ERM II Planned
(as of May 2005) adoption of Euro
Czech Republic Managed float to Euro Not announced 2010
Estonia ERM II member (as of June 2004)  June 2004 2007
Cyprus ERM II member (as of May 2005) May 2005 1)
Latvia ERM II member (as of May 2005) May 2005 2008
Lithuania ERM II member (as of June 2004)  June 2004 2007
Hungary Peg to euro with band ±15% Not announced 2010
Malta ERM II member (as of May 2005) May 2005 2)
Poland Free Float Not announced 2008-2009
Slovenia ERM II member (as of June 2004)  June 2004 2007
Slovakia Managed float 2006 2009
Table 9.1 Exchange rate regimes, plans for ERM II entry and Euro adoption
Source: ECB.
1) As soon as possible after ERM II Membership.
2) As soon as economic convergence permits.
Chart 8.3 Size of the banking sector and
stock market, 2004
y-axis: Stock market capitalisation as % of GDP
x-axis: Total loans of MFIs in % of GDP
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Sources: ECB, Federation of European Securities Exchanges,
national central banks and World Federation of Exchanges.
16 ERM II is a system of bilateral exchange rate bands with the
euro, whose main elements are the central parity (to which
markets tend to attribute a high signalling value as to future
conversion rates) and a wide band size (±15%), combined
with a unilateral intervention requirement at the margin. An
explanation of ECB policy concerning exchange rate issues
relating to the NMS can be found at: http://www.ecb.int/pub/
pdf/other/policyaccexchangerateen.pdf.30
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Chart 9.1 Volatility of nominal and real bilateral exchange rates, 1993-2004
a. Nominal bilateral exchange rate1)
(moving sample standard deviations)2)
1) For the NMS: vis-à-vis EUR, “synthetic” EUR prior to
1999; for the euro area: simple average of the 12 member
countries’ bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis EUR/”synthetic”
EUR prior to 1999.
2) Of the rate of change in the bilateral exchange rate (vis-à-
vis EUR, “synthetic EUR”) with smoothing parameter n = 4.
b. Real bilateral exchange rate1)
(moving sample standard deviations)2)
1) For the NMS: vis-à-vis EUR, “synthetic” EUR prior to
1999 (CPI-deflated); for the euro area: simple average of the
national competitiveness indicators of the 12 member
countries
2) Of the rate of change in the bilateral exchange rate (vis-à-
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formerly unstable countries have to endure
before being admitted to the “paradise” of
Monetary Union.
The exchange rate regimes currently in place in
all NMS and their status vis-à-vis entry into
ERM II and adoption of the euro are
summarised in Table 9.1. Two questions arise
at this point. The first question is whether the
exchange rate instrument can still be used by
NMS –  within the confines of a set of rules –
during convergence from very uneven initial
price levels and supply side conditions. The
second question – which is addressed in
Section 10 – asks whether, in the meantime,
monetary policy can contribute as a stabilizing
factor.
9.1 NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE
MOVEMENTS
The first question is addressed in three stages.
In the first stage we discuss the record of
exchange rate movements, both nominal and
real, of NMS in the last decade. We look at
gradual cumulative changes in the nominal and
real bilateral exchange rates of the NMS
currencies vis-à-vis the euro. Chart 2.3 has
already illustrated how NMS have pursued
different strategies over the last decade.
Several NMS, have pegged their nominal
exchange rate, displaying a trend toward
measured real appreciation, while a few seem
to peg the real exchange rate.
Chart 9.1 (Panels a and b) presents volatilities
of nominal and real bilateral exchange rates of
NMS and the euro area from 1993 to 2004.17
Most NMS experienced in the early 1990s a
high volatility of their bilateral exchange rates
and very significant changes vis-à-vis the euro.
The 1993-95/96 period is particularly
“turbulent” for most NMS. Nominal bilateral
exchange rates significantly depreciated, while
real bilateral exchange rates generally
appreciated. Nominal and real exchange rate
volatility was also quite high in this early
period and then subsided, to rise again during
the Asian and Russian crisis and its aftermath.
17 Moving sample standard deviation of the growth rate of the
bilateral exchange rate e (vis-à-vis EUR, “synthetic EUR”)






















Volatility then declines for most currencies
after 2000. Compared with the volatility of the
euro area exchange rate, in the more recent
period NMS exchange rates do not appear to
have been exceedingly volatile, possibly also
as a result of pegs.
Chart 9.2 plots nominal and real exchange rate
volatilities on a bilateral and effective basis for
each NMS. The chart shows of course that both
volatilities tend to be correlated across
countries, as one would expect when prices are
relatively sticky. An important aspect is,
however, that real variability tends to exceed
nominal variability (the points in the charts are
mainly above the 45-degree line), which might
indicate an effort towards nominal
stabilisation.
9.2 REAL EXCHANGE RATE CONVERGENCE
In the second stage we compare the short-term
dynamics of NMS real exchange rates with
those within the euro area. Clearly, in the years
subsequent to 1999 there were no nominal
exchange rate changes among euro area
countries. In Chart 9.3 we plot the average real
exchange rate changes with the euro area, for
each NMS country, against the initial price
levels (comparative price levels of final
household consumption including indirect
taxes, calculated by Eurostat). The aim is to see
whether price levels tended to converge in the
period concerned, i.e. 1999-2004. We also
show the euro area countries in a separate
panel. Changes in real exchange rates for euro
area countries coincide with the cumulated
inflation differentials of each country relative
to the area, since in this period no changes in
nominal exchange rates took place. The slope
of the interpolating lines gives the average
speed of convergence of relative prices, per
unit of deviation of price levels from the “law
of one price” (absolute purchasing power
parity). The chart confirms that convergence to32
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Chart 9.2 Volatility of bilateral and effective exchange rates for NMS1), 1993-2004
(period averages) 2)
Source: ECB.
1) Vis-à-vis EUR and “synthetic” EUR prior to 1999.
2) Based upon moving sample standard deviations with smoothing parameter n = 4.
Bilateral exchange rate variability
y-axis: Real exchange rate variability
x-axis: Nominal exchange rate variability
0        0.005       0.01     0.015      0.02      0.025       0.03
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the law of one price did indeed take place, both
in the NMS and in the euro area, and also
suggests that the speed of adjustment may have
been systematically higher in the NMS than in
the euro area.
There may be three broad types of explanations
of why the speed of adjustment of real
exchange rates differs across NMS. First, the
adjustment speed could be related to the size of
the deviation in a non-linear way, e.g. more
than proportionally. In this case, countries
deviating more from purchasing power parity
(e.g. the NMS with lower comparative price
levels) would tend to converge more rapidly.
Second, the difference could be due to the
exchange rate regime; for example, the speed
could be higher if the nominal exchange rate is
allowed to adjust more flexibly. This would be
the case if goods prices are sticky while
exchange rates adjust flexibly and in a way
consistent with external balance. The third
explanation is that differences in adjustment
speeds could be due to other economic
characteristics. One example of this is the
country’s openness to external trade and
capital movements: the more open the country,
the higher the market pressure towards
adjustment would tend to be.
9.3 THE SPEED OF REAL EXCHANGE
CONVERGENCE
In the third stage we combine data for the NMS
and for euro area countries in a single data
panel in order to estimate the effects of
different exchange rate regimes on the speed of
convergence of real exchange rates. The panel
estimates in Table 9.2 explore these issues on
the basis of annual data in Chart 9.3 for the
period 1995-2004, including both NMS and
euro area countries; the dependent variable is
the annual change in the real bilateral exchange
rate (RER). Again we lay out a general
specification that encompasses, in a simple
way, the three explanations just discussed:
(2) ∆RERt    =     β0    +    β1 · RERt-1    +    β2 · RER2
t-1
+    β3 · NMS     +    β4 · Trade opennesst
+    β5 ·  Monetary&Exchange Regime.
In the case of the NMS, RER stands for the
logged real bilateral exchange rate of the euro
vis-à-vis the national currency. In the case of
the euro area, RER stands for the (log) national
competitiveness indicator; its squared term
tries to capture a possible non-linearity; NMS
is a dummy variable for NMS; and Trade
opennesst  is the ratio of each country’s exports33
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plus imports to GDP. As proxy for the monetary
and exchange regime we tried two alternative
specifications. The first simply differentiates
the NMS according to whether for most of the
sample they a) followed de facto an inflation
targeting regime and floated their exchange
rates (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), or
b) had fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates (all
others). The second uses instead the “natural
classification” of exchange regimes proposed
by the IMF (Rogoff et al., 2004). In using this
classification, we simply distinguish between
three categories: pegged, limited flexibility,
and managed or full floating. An important
distinction between the two specifications is
that the classification proposed by Rogoff et al.
(2004) allows for changes in the exchange rate
regime over time, whereas the measures in
equations (3) to (6) simply amount to a set of
country dummies.
Column (1) (Table 9.2) shows that there is a
systematically faster convergence in the NMS
than the euro area, quantifiable at about 3.4%
(i.e. the gap is closed by this amount on average
on a yearly basis). This confirms the visual
impression from the chart. The nonlinear term
has its expected sign and is highly significant.
Trade openness as an economic characteristic
which influences the adjustment speed is not
very significant when the regressions are run
with the NMS dummy. Columns (3) to (6) add
our dummies for inflation targeting/floating
and for fixed/semi-fixed exchange rates: the
coefficients are not significant if the NMS
dummy is kept, but the dummy for a fixed/
semi-fixed regime becomes significant if the
NMS is taken out of the regression. One
drawback of this estimate is that since the
dummy is not time-varying, it tends to be very
close to minus the NMS dummy, since all euro
area countries belong to the fixed/semi-fixed
group (column (5)). The estimates using the
Dependent
variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆RERt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7IMF)( 8 IMF)( 9 IMF)
Independent
variables: Pooled OLS1) Pooled OLS1)
Constant (β0) 5.90*** 5.77*** 5.74*** 5.68*** 6.37*** 5.84*** 5.56** 4.89** 5.61**
(2.0297) (2.0262) (2.1245) (2.0563) (2.0263) (2.0596) (2.2566) (2.5419) (2.1039)
RERt-1 -2.35*** -2.30** -2.28** -2.25** -2.54*** -2.30** -2.21** -1.90* -2.22**
(0.9046) (0.9164) (0.9441) (0.9195) (0.9068) (0.9211) (0.9982) (1.1312) (0.9392)
RER2
t-1 0.23* 0.22* 0.22** 0.22** 0.25** 0.22** 0.21* 0.18* 0.21**
(0.1009) (0.1022) (0.1050) (0.1028) (0.1014) (0.1030) (0.1107) (0.1259) (0.1050)
NMS 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.019* 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.025***
(0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0082)
Trade opennesst 0.020* 0.019* 0.026* 0.037*** 0.019 0.022* 0.024*
(0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0133) (0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0127)
M&E Regime M&E
Regime
– IT & floating 0.002 – pegged 0.006
(0.0114) (0.0098)






Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.52
Table 9.2 Real Exchange Rate Convergence – panel estimation: NMS (excl. CY and MT) and euro
area (excl. LU), 1995-2004
Sources: AMECO (EC/ECFIN) and ECB.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
1) Based on “dynamic completeness of the conditional mean” (see data appendix).
***: = sign. at 1%; **: = sign. at 5%; *: = sign. at 10%.34
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Chart 9.3 Convergence of real exchange rates
Sources: ECB and Eurostat.
1) NCI: national competitiveness indicator (Q1 1999 = 100).
2) Comparative price levels of final consumption by households including indirect taxes.
New Member States
y-axis: Real exchange rate, annual % change (1999-2004)
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IMF proxy are presented next. Overall, they
seem to perform somewhat better empirically
than our crude time-invariant dummies. As a
result, it cannot be excluded that a limited
degree of flexibility reduces the adjustment
speed. Other forms of exchange rate policy do
not play a significant role.
We summarise the evidence in this section as
follows. First, despite some short-term
volatility, real exchange rates in the NMS have
steadily converged in recent years. The speed
of convergence since 1999 has been higher than
that observed among the euro area countries. It
cannot be excluded that the flexibility of the
exchange rate may have played a role in
shaping this difference, though more evidence
would be needed before strong conclusions can
be drawn on this issue.
10 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE
CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY
This section examines the convergence of the
NMS in the sphere of central banking. The aim
is to see whether central bank institutions and
monetary policy-making in the NMS have
evolved in a way consistent with participation
in the euro area.
Central bank legal independence, as defined by
the Treaty, and conformity with the euro area
central bank operational framework are formal
prerequisites for adopting the single currency.
The European Commission and the ECB
monitor progress in this area in their
convergence reports (European Commission,
2004; ECB, 2004), providing a detailed
account of the extent to and the way in which
the relevant Treaty provisions are translated
into the national legislation and central bank
statutes. Hence, the convergence reports are
the most complete published sources for an
assessment of the legal convergence of
candidate countries’ central banks. Here we
use the results of the 2004 Commission
Convergence Report (Table 2.1) to calculate
summary indicators of central bank legal and
operational convergence for each NMS and for
a selected number of legal areas. The results are
reported in Table 10.1, where the indices are
expressed in percentages (a value of 100 means
full adaptation, 0 no adaptation at all18). As one
can see, convergence is largely complete in the
key area of legal independence. The chapter
18 Based on the European Commission Convergence Report
(2004). Indices calculated by scoring the legal compatibility
in the NMS: a score of 3 stands for convergence, a score of 2
for provisions requiring clarification, a score of 1 for
imperfections, and a score of 0 for incompatible provisions.35
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“Objectives and decisions” (of the above
report) refers to the way in which policy
decisions are adopted and the criteria on which
they are based, as well as the personal
independence of the Governor and the Board.
“Monetary financing” refers to the Treaty
requirement that the central bank should not
finance the public sector with monetary means.
In both areas the index value is above 80% in all
countries and often reaches 100%.
The chapter “Integration in the ESCB” refers to
how and how much the central bank’s
operational and administrative framework is in
line with the European System of Central
Banks. In this area, more technical than the
preceding one, progress is less complete. Aside
from “Banknotes and coins”, an area that does
not require the participation of all central
banks, the sub-areas where preparation is less
advanced are those relating to monetary
operation (i.e. the preparation to participate in
the system’s open market transactions) and
foreign exchange operations. All in all,
however, the picture emerging from Table 10.1
suggests that preparation is fairly advanced in
most key areas.
Beyond these formal and technical
requirements, however, it is of interest to
examine whether the candidate central banks
possess other characteristics that may facilitate
CY CZ EE LV LT HU MT PL SK SI
Central Bank Independence
A: Objectives and Decisions 96.8 87.3 87.3 87.3 96.8 87.3 96.8 84.1 87.3 87.3
B: Monetary Financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.7 93.3 86.7 86.7 100.0
Integration in the ESCB:
C: FX-Operations 72.2 69.4 69.4 69.4 52.8 50.0 38.9 38.9 66.7 83.3
D: Monetary Operations 57.1 57.1 42.9 71.4 42.9 42.9 42.9 28.6 28.6 52.4
E: Banknotes/Coins 0.0 8.3 25.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 25.0
F: Financial Provisions 100.0 80.0 73.3 60.0 100.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 60.0 100.0
G: Other issues 71.4 78.6 64.3 75.0 71.4 81.0 76.2 77.4 73.8 100.0
Overall Index: 78.5 75.5 71.2 74.2 76.6 72.6 72.6 66.4 68.3 83.9
Table 10.1 Central bank legislation
  (in % of total legal convergence)1)
Source: Commission Convergence Report 2004 and ECB.
1) Calculated by scoring the legal compatibility in the NMS: 3 = convergence. 2 = provisions requiring clarification.
1=imperfections. 0 = incompatible provisions.
their smooth integration into the euro area
monetary policy decision-making mechanism.
As argued by, for example, De Haan et al. (2004,
chapter 6), legal arrangements may at times be
misleading or insufficient to fully explain the
real institutional status or the actual
independence of central banks. Seeing the
substance behind the legal and statutory veil is
complex, however. Considering that a central
element in ECB policy is its commitment to
maintain price stability in the medium term, it is
natural to ask whether the recent record of
practical policy-making of the candidate central
banks is consistent with this objective.
Examining the actual behaviour of central banks
is one way of checking whether their preferences
with regard to policy objectives are similar19.
Taking this into account, in the rest of this
section we estimate monetary policy decision
rules for the three largest NMS (Hungary, Czech
Republic and Poland) and compare them with a
corresponding estimate for the euro area, over
the period 1995-2004, using monthly data. The
19 Monetary policy decision-making rules are influenced by the
preferences central banks have with regard to policy
outcomes and by the monetary transmission mechanism. On
the basis of this idea, Cecchetti and Krause (…) use the
parameters of reaction functions to infer, under certain
assumptions, the objectives of central banks. Angeloni and
Dedola (1999) compared the decision rules of European
central banks before the introduction of the euro and
concluded that they had become more similar in the decade
preceding 1999.36
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three countries are particularly relevant on
account of their size. They are also suitable for
our purpose because their monetary policy
regimes have been comparable: they have for
years conducted an independent monetary policy
within an inflation targeting framework and with
floating or flexible exchange rates20.
We approximate the policy of each of these
three countries and that of the euro area in the
simplest possible form, a Taylor rule with
exponential interest rate smoothing:
(3) it = βl · it–1 + (1 – β1) · (β0 + β2 · pt–1 + β3 ·
ygapt–1  + β4 · i*
t–1) + β5 · dummy +  t
where  t i  is a short-term interest rate,  1 − t π  and
1 − t ygap  represent a lagged inflation rate and
lagged output gap respectively, 
*
1 − t i  is the US
dollar short-term interest rate relevant for the
euro area,21 and  t ε  is an error term. Striking a
compromise between the need to have a
homogeneous period for estimation and
the need to gain degrees of freedom, we
estimate over a period starting in 1995 and then
correct with constant dummies the pre-EMU
years (for the euro area) and the years
preceding the adoption of inflation targeting
for NMS.22
Our analytical strategy is as follows. First, we
perform a separate estimation of the policy rule
for each country and for the euro area, to study
the characteristics of the estimates in a simple
mono-equational context. Next, we estimate a
system, to exploit the cross-country
correlations of the residuals, and within this
system we perform cross-equation restriction
tests. In particular we are interested in testing
the homogeneity with the euro area across
countries of some key parameters, such as
interest rate smoothing – which can proxy the
degree of policy activism – and the reaction to
inflation – which proxies the degree of aversion
to deviations from price stability.
All results are summarised in Table 10.2. The
first panel shows the individual estimates, and
the panels below show the system estimation
and the tests of the restrictions respectively.
The country-specific estimates display a
reasonable goodness of fit and broadly
plausible coefficients. Interest smoothing is
high, especially in Hungary, and higher than in
the euro area. The (long-term) coefficient on
inflation is significant (except in Hungary) but
below unity, violating the “Taylor principle”.
This coefficient is below unity for the euro
area. However, it rises above unity if one also
considers the effect of the foreign interest rate:
an increase in global inflation, equally rising
domestic and foreign inflation, and foreign
interest rates to the same extent or more would
raise euro area rates more than inflation. The
output gap coefficients are not significant for
the Czech Republic and Hungary. The system
estimation (second panel) in general
strengthens the results. The tests of cross-
equation restrictions (third panel) suggest that
the speed of adjustments is higher in the NMS
than in the euro area; but the long-run effects of
inflation are broadly similar, as are those of the
output gap.
Our empirical findings regarding the stance of
the monetary policy of the ECB are in line with
other studies that discuss monetary policy
decision rules for the euro area by applying
Taylor-type reaction functions with interest
rate smoothing. Surico (2003) considers
asymmetric preferences of the ECB but finds
no evidence of asymmetric responses other
than strong reactions to output contractions. As
in our case, his point estimates of lagged
inflation first violate the Taylor principle, but
considering cross products of the state
20 The Czech National Bank became the first NMS central bank
to directly target a price stability objective in 1997. Poland
followed in 1998 and Hungary in 2001.
21 This rate, which improves the empirical fit of the euro area
specification, can be interpreted as a proxy for inflationary
pressures of global origin, stemming from international
prices (to which the US rate may react first) and the
exchange rate.
22 This amounts to assuming that all coefficients are constant
across regimes except the constant; obviously a strong
assumption, justifiable only on the basis of the short data
period available.37
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variables and reasonable values of the output
gap implies a feedback parameter of inflation
greater than 1. On the other hand, Gerlach and
Schnabel (1998) find that the original Taylor
rule augmented by a smoothing parameter fits
the euro area data quite well, with a slope of
1.5 on (future) inflation and 0.5 on the
(contemporaneous) output gap. Another
contribution along this line is represented by
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004), in which the
a. Country specific estimation
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Euro area
Constant 0,011 0.059 0.067*** 0,0004
(0.012) (0.0441) (0.0197) (0.0049)
Lagged dependent 0.90*** 0.95*** 0.90*** 0.81***
(0.0308) (0.0466) (0.0333) (0.0291)
Inflation 0.85*** 0.59 0.79*** 0.81***
(0.2506) (0.5588) (0.2653) (0.1876)
Output-gap 0.11 0.5 0.79* 0.16*
(0.2799) (0.8793) (0.4594) (0.0932)
Foreign interest rate — — — 0.46***
(0.0556)
Dummy 0.0037** -0.0005 0.0003 1995: 0.0036*** (0.0009)
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0044) 1996: 0.0007       (0.0007)
1997: 0.0010**   (0.0005)
Adjusted – R² 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99
Table 10.2 Monetary policy rules, 1995-2004
b. System Estimation1)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Euro area
Constant 0.011 0.057 0.067*** 0.0009
(0.012) (0.041) (0.0211) (0.0049)
Lagged dependent 0.91*** 0.94*** 0.91*** 0.82***
(0.0301) (0.0444) (0.0323) (0.0274)
Inflation 0.86*** 0.71 0.78*** 0.86***
(0.2478) (0.4612) (0.2807) (0.185)
Output-gap 0.11 0.38 0.85* 0.15*
(0.2771) (0.7681) (0.4975) (0.0908)
Foreign interest rate — — — 0.47***
(0.055)
Dummy 0.0036** -0.0014 0.00008 1995: 0.0033*** (0.0009)
(0.0016) (0.0027) (0.004) 1996: 0.0006       (0.0006)
1997: 0.0009*     (0.0005)
Adjusted - R² 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99
c. Wald-test of equality of coefficients with the euro area2)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
Short-run coefficient: 4.76** 5.52** 4.17**
lagged dependent
Long-run coefficient: 0.00019 0.092 0.055
inflation
Long-run coefficient: 0.023 0.085 1.92
output-gap
Source: ECB, Eurostat and OECD Main Economic Indicators
Standard errors in parenthesis.
1) See data appendix for estimation details.
2) Wald-test statistic reported – Chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equaling the number of equality restrictions.
***: = sign. at 1%; **: = sign. at 5%; *: = sign. at 10%.
“—” indicates that the coefficient is not significant in the estimation.38
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 36
September 2005
authors account in particular for economic
variables that a fictitious ECB might have
taken into consideration (e.g. USD/EUR
exchange rates, M3 growth and commodity
prices). Their coefficient of inflation ranges
from 1.9 to 2.2 with deviations of output being
in a range of 0.1 to 0.5. Finally, Gerlach-
Kristen (2003) estimates reaction functions
under the assumption that interest rates,
inflation and output are cointegrated and
argues that, in contrast to traditional Taylor
rules, these cointegrated monetary policy
reaction functions forecast better out of
sample. Interpreting long-run interest rates as a
proxy for long-run inflation expectations, her
estimates imply a coefficient of inflation of
1.73.
In summary, legal and operational
compatibility of the NMS with legal
arrangements of the European System of
Central Banks is fairly advanced. While
convergence is largely completed in the key
area of legal independence, preparations are
less advanced in the more technical area of
central banks’ operational and administrative
framework. Regarding the actual monetary
policy-making in the NMS, the key policy
objective preferences of the three largest NMS
(Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) are
consistent with the ECB’s commitment to price
stability, while the degree of policy activism
(i.e. the speed of adjustments) is higher in the
NMS than in the euro area.
11 CONCLUSIONS
After their accession to the EU in May 2004,
the ten new Member States have automatically
become candidates for EMU, and some have
already announced calendars for joining. This
paper has shed some light on diverse aspects of
the monetary integration of the NMS with the
euro area.
First, all NMS have been able to achieve a high
pace of nominal convergence in recent years.
As regards real convergence, however, and in
diverse policy areas, the record is more mixed
and differentiated across NMS. For example,
public finance is a cloud on the horizon for
several NMS.
Second, looking at more structural factors we
find that, while trade integration with the EU15
has progressed quickly in recent years and is
now quite advanced, convergence in output
specialisation to EU standards (characterised
by a relatively low share of agriculture and a
high share of services in aggregate output) has
been slow, especially if measured in real terms
(excluding changes in relative prices). This
suggests that while relative prices have moved
flexibly, part of the real adjustment processes
that these price changes are supposed to
stimulate may be lagging behind. We have also
shown that the difference in output
specialisation relative to euro area countries
may influence negatively the pace of the real
convergence of NMS.
Third, there is also some evidence that a few
NMS have a higher degree of business cycle
synchronization with the euro area: hence, they
may be less likely to be affected by radically
different economic shocks (and will need less
means to mitigate those shocks). This,
however, is not true for all NMS.
Fourth, we find that many NMS are quite
advanced relative to the euro area in the process
of labour market and institutional reform (their
labour market structures are more flexible than
those of the euro area countries), while they lag
significantly behind in building up their
financial systems. Hence, as regards financial
structures and financial deepening, much
remains to be done.
Fifth, there is evidence that real exchange rates
have moved – broadly speaking – in line with
long-term fundamental equilibria, and some
exchange rate flexibility may still be useful for
some NMS.
Sixth, the monetary policy institutions of the
NMS have also converged to some degree. The39
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11 CONCLUSIONS
goals and institutional settings of central banks
are now much more similar than before.
Looking at central bank statutes, objectives,
strategies and instruments, we find that good
progress has recently been made in developing
sound central banking structures.
All in all, there has been very significant
progress in the integration of the NMS but a lot
remains to be done. There are also still
differences across them. Our view is that the
conditions for full monetary integration have
still not been reached for the group of NMS as a
whole. A case-by-case approach to adopting
the euro – based on country-specific conditions
– therefore seems natural.40
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AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, CZ:
Czech Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark,
EE: Estonia, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR:
France, GR: Greece, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, JP: Japan, LU: Luxembourg, LT:
Lithuania, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, NL:
Netherlands, PL: Poland,  PT: Portugal, SE:
Sweden, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, UK:
United Kingdom
CURRENCY ABBREVIATIONS:
CYP: Cyprus pound, CZK: Czech koruna,
EEK: Estonian kroon, EUR: euro, HUF:
Hungarian forint, LTL: Lithuanian litas, LVL:
Latvian lats, MTL: Maltese lira, PLN: Polish




– calculated as described in the text
– yearly data
– source: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN)
TABLE 3.2:
– see Table 3.1
TABLE 3.3:
– basic calculation: see text; investment:
gross capital formation of total economy
relative to GDP (1995 prices)
– yearly data
– countries considered: CZ, EE, LV, LT, HU,
PL, SK, SI
– “dynamic completeness of the conditional
mean”: assuming the absence of time-
constant omitted factors, there are enough
regressors to explain all influence of
exogenous and lagged dependent variables
on the regressand – i.e. strict exogeneity
assumption relaxed, pooled OLS
appropriate provided that the pooled
OLS-residuals are not serially correlated
and (favourably) homoskedastic. If
heteroskedasticity is detected but no serial
correlation, then the usual
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
and test statistics from the pooled OLS
regression can be used (for further
discussion see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 171-
179). In Table 3.3 neither serial correlation
nor heteroskedasticity was detected (test
results are available from the authors upon
request)
– sources: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN), Eurostat
TABLE 5.1:
– calculated as described in the text
– yearly data
– sources: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN), IMF-DTS
TABLE 5.2:




– source: European Commission, European
Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO)
“Industrial Relations in the EU Member
States and Candidate Countries”(2002)
TABLE 6.2:
– source: OECD, Riboud et al. (2002),
European Commission, and Polish Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Labour website for
data on Poland
TABLE 7.1:
– sources: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN), Eurostat
TABLE 7.2:
– source: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN)41
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– calculated as described in the text; total
loans: including loans to other MFIs;
corporate debt by residence of issuer:
international debt securities (amount
outstanding) all issuers plus domestic debt
securities (amount outstanding) all issuers
– sources: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN), BankScope, BIS, ECB, Federation





– basic calculations: see text; real bilateral
exchange rates vis-à-vis EUR/“synthetic”
EUR prior to 1999 (CPI-deflated, Q1 1999 =
100): yearly averages (based on monthly
data); national competitiveness indicators
(Q1 1999 = 100): yearly averages (based on
monthly data)
– Exchange  regime:
• Equ. (1)-(6): de facto exchange rate
arrangements
• Equ (7IMF)-(9IMF): using IMF/Rogoff et al.
(2004) definitions of “natural
classification”
– yearly data
– countries considered: CZ, EE, LV, LT, HU,
PL, SK, SI, AT, BE, DE, GR, FI, FR, IE, IT,
NL, PT, ES.
– see Table 3.3 for a discussion of “dynamic
completeness of the conditional mean”; in
Table 9.2, we corrected for cross-section
heteroskedasticity (test results are available
from the authors upon request)
– sources: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN), ECB
TABLE 10.1:
– based on the European Commission
Convergence Report (2004). Indices
calculated by scoring the legal compatibility
in the NMS: 3 = convergence, 2 = provisions
requiring clarification, 1 = imperfections,
0 = incompatible provisions
– sources: European Commission
Convergence Report (2004), ECB
TABLE 10.2:
– basic calculations: see text; interest rates:
one-month interbank rates for CZ, HU, PL
and the euro area, federal funds rate for the
United States; inflation: national CPI/HICP,
output gap: difference between industrial
production and its Hodrick-Prescott trend
– monthly data, seasonally adjusted
– “system estimation” based on nonlinear
GLS
– sources: ECB, Eurostat, OECD Main
Economic Indicators
TABLE A.1:
– calculated as described in the text
– yearly data




– source: Eurostat and ECB
CHART 2.2:
– annual data; data on GDP and gross value
added: total economy, working-day adjusted
– sources: Eurostat and ECB
CHART 2.3:
– annual and monthly data; data on current






– sources: European Commission, OECD and
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CHART 8.2:
– sources: AMECO (European Commission/
ECFIN), IMF-IFS
CHART 8.3:
– calculated as described in the text
– sources: ECB, Federation of European
Securities Exchanges, national central
banks, World Federation of Exchanges
CHART 9.1:
– calculated as described in the text; real
bilateral exchange rate (CPI-deflated);
national competitiveness indicator
– monthly data (Q1 1999 = 100)
– source: ECB
CHART 9.2:
– see Figure 9.1
CHART 9.3:
– real bilateral exchange rate and national
competitiveness indicator: see Figure 9.1;
yearly growth rate; comparative price
levels: comparative price levels of final
consumption by households including
indirect taxes
– sources: ECB, Eurostat43
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a. Share of euro area exports to selected regions1)
(ratio of exports to total exports)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Towards New Member States
mean 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
stdev 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04
Towards euro area
mean 0,52 0,51 0,45 0,46 0,51 0,51 0,50 0,49 0,51 0,50
stdev 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09
Towards other EU15
mean 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,10
stdev 0,04 0,04 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05
Towards USA
mean 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07
stdev 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04
Towards Asia
mean 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
stdev 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03
Towards ROW
mean 0,20 0,20 0,28 0,27 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22
stdev 0,04 0,04 0,06 0,05 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,08
Table A.1 Exports and imports – summary tables
Source: IMF-Direction of Trade Statistics and authors’ calculations.
1) Numbers may not sum up to 100% due to rounding errors.
2) Excl. MT 1995/1996/1997 and HU 1995; numbers may not sum up to 100% due to rounding errors.
b. Share of euro area imports from selected regions1)
(ratio of imports to total imports)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
From New Member States
mean 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05
stdev 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,04
From euro area
mean 0,51 0,51 0,44 0,45 0,50 0,48 0,49 0,49 0,50 0,50
stdev 0,09 0,09 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10
From other EU15
mean 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,08
stdev 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06
From USA
mean 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05
stdev 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03
From Asia
mean 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09
stdev 0,02 0,02 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05
From ROW
mean 0,21 0,21 0,29 0,27 0,22 0,24 0,24 0,23 0,23 0,23
stdev 0,04 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,0749
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c. Share of NMS exports to selected regions2)
(ratio of exports to total exports)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Towards New Member States
mean 0,14 0,16 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,14
stdev 0,14 0,12 0,11 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,06
Towards euro area
mean 0,40 0,49 0,53 0,57 0,61 0,60 0,59 0,57 0,58 0,55
stdev 0,27 0,25 0,24 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,25 0,26 0,24
Towards other EU15
mean 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,10 0,09 0,09
stdev 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,0
Towards USA
mean 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04
stdev 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02
Towards Asia
mean 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02
stdev 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,03
Towards ROW
mean 0,18 0,22 0,20 0,17 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,15 0,15 0,16
stdev 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,08 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,06
d. Share of NMS imports from selected regions2)
(ratio of imports to total imports)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
From New Member States
mean 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,11
stdev 0,11 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,06
From euro area
mean 0,48 0,48 0,50 0,55 0,55 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,58
stdev 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,09
From other EU15
mean 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06
stdev 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03
From USA
mean 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,01
stdev 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01
From Asia
mean 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,07
stdev 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03
From ROW
mean 0,20 0,24 0,22 0,18 0,17 0,20 0,20 0,19 0,18 0,17
stdev 0,11 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,08
Source: IMF-Direction of Trade Statistics and authors’ calculations.
1) Numbers may not sum up to 100% due to rounding errors.
2) Excl. MT 1995/1996/1997 and HU 1995; numbers may not sum up to 100% due to rounding errors.50
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